Simply Given: Self-Gift and Consubstantiality in Aquinas and Social Trinitarianism
Social Trinitarians have long argued that a strong reading of consubstantiality rules out the possibility of anything interpersonal – including interpersonal self-giving – in God. I argue that, for Aquinas, the claim that all three persons are identical to the same nature is no threat to interperson...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2024
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| In: |
International journal of systematic theology
Year: 2024, Volume: 26, Issue: 3, Pages: 274-293 |
| IxTheo Classification: | KAE Church history 900-1300; high Middle Ages NBC Doctrine of God |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Social Trinitarians have long argued that a strong reading of consubstantiality rules out the possibility of anything interpersonal – including interpersonal self-giving – in God. I argue that, for Aquinas, the claim that all three persons are identical to the same nature is no threat to interpersonal self-giving. Nor is it merely compatible with interpersonal self-giving. Instead, it is necessary for the fullest possible self-giving: if the Father and the Son did not share a single nature, then the Father could not give everything he has to the Son. |
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| ISSN: | 1468-2400 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal of systematic theology
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/ijst.12685 |
