Two "logic" problems for religious expressivists
Religious expressivism is the view that religious sentences, like "God is all-loving" and "God offers us the gift of salvation", are devoid of cognitive meaning. Such sentences are not truth-evaluable: they cannot be judged as true or false. In Religious Language, Michael Scott a...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
2024
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| In: |
Religious studies
Year: 2024, Volume: 60, Issue: 2, Pages: 235-243 |
| Further subjects: | B
religious expressivism
B Weak Kleene B negation problem B Frege-Geach problem B Religious Language |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Religious expressivism is the view that religious sentences, like "God is all-loving" and "God offers us the gift of salvation", are devoid of cognitive meaning. Such sentences are not truth-evaluable: they cannot be judged as true or false. In Religious Language, Michael Scott asked what explains the seeming logical behaviour of religious sentences if they are not truth-evaluable, as religious expressivists claim. In particular, religious expressivists need to explain (i) how a given religious sentence and its negation seem inconsistent and (ii) how religious sentences could figure in logically valid arguments. In this article, I develop a version of Weak Kleene semantics that could address these two "logic" challenges. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412523000380 |