The Methodologies of John Rawls and Axel Honneth: A Critical Clarification
This paper compares and discusses John Rawls’s and Axel Honneth’s methodologies. It aims to clarify the similarities and differences between their respective approaches and to advance the debate about their relative advantages and disadvantages. To that end, I analyse their frameworks as instances o...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Peeters
2023
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| In: |
Ethical perspectives
Year: 2023, Volume: 30, Issue: 3, Pages: 221-250 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | This paper compares and discusses John Rawls’s and Axel Honneth’s methodologies. It aims to clarify the similarities and differences between their respective approaches and to advance the debate about their relative advantages and disadvantages. To that end, I analyse their frameworks as instances of wide reflective equilibrium: both seek to obtain a coherence between intuitions, philosophical and scientific background theories about personhood and social life, and principles of justice. Each element is discussed in turn. I start by considering the Honnethian objection that Rawls’s methodology offers an external criticism of society that does not reflect people’s moral experiences. I show, pace Honneth, how intuitions or moral experiences have a central place in both methodologies. I also argue that Honneth’s particular attention to controversial and more implicit moral experiences of oppressed groups does not appear to be an advantage. Next, I examine Honneth’s charge that Rawls’s methodology forces him to ignore important facts about human nature and the Rawlsian counter charge that Honneth’s theory is too comprehensive, considering the fact of reasonable pluralism. I argue that Honneth’s complaint is exaggerated. Regarding the counter charge, I suggest that Honnethians should consider distinguishing more sharply between strong and weak immanent criticism. Controversial background theories might be largely avoided in the latter context and this would make the justification less controversial to reasonable citizens. Finally, I discuss the connection between background theories and principles of justice in the two methodologies. It is argued that the recognitional approach should consider making use of a weak constructivist procedure to derive specific principles of justice from abstract background theories about personhood and social life. |
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| ISSN: | 1783-1431 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.30.3.3292837 |