Relative Preferences
Neoclassical economics traditionally has assumed that consumer preferences are independent of each other and has neglected the desire of individuals for relative position. To the extent that legal scholarship has addressed this interdependence of preferences, it has focused entirely on altruism and...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Yale Law Journal Co.
1992
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| In: |
The Yale law journal
Year: 1992, Volume: 102, Issue: 1, Pages: 1-104 |
| Further subjects: | B
Girard, René (1923-2015)
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| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Neoclassical economics traditionally has assumed that consumer preferences are independent of each other and has neglected the desire of individuals for relative position. To the extent that legal scholarship has addressed this interdependence of preferences, it has focused entirely on altruism and envy. Professor McAdams focuses on a different manner in which preferences may be interdependent: people often desire, as an end in itself, to equal or surpass the consumption level of others. Drawing upon social science literature, the Article discusses the importance of relative preferences to descriptive and normative legal theories. Under certain conditions, unregulated competition to satisfy these relative preferences will produce outcomes inferior to those made possible by regulation. Professor McAdams discusses the factors that create this market failure, the rare conditions under which satisfaction of relative preferences is desirable, and the implications for law and legal theory. In particular, the Article considers taxation and antidiscrimination laws as ways of limiting wasteful individual and group status competition. |
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| Item Description: | Comment(s): References to "Deceit, Desire and the Novel"., BN: 102, HN: 1 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: The Yale law journal
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2307/796772 |