Parthenogenesis, identity, and value

Parthenogenesis is a form of asexual reproduction in which a gamete (ovum or sperm) develops without being fertilized. Tomer Jordi Chaffer uses parthenogenesis to challenge Don Marquis' future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion. According to Marquis, (1) what makes it morally wrong to ki...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Simkulet, William (Author)
Tipo de documento: Recurso Electrónico Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publicado em: 2024
Em: Bioethics
Ano: 2024, Volume: 38, Número: 5, Páginas: 419-424
Classificações IxTheo:NBE Antropologia
NCH Ética da medicina
NCJ Ética da ciência
Outras palavras-chave:B future-like-ours
B parthenogenesis
B Don Marquis
B Twinning
B Metaphysics
B Contraception
B Identity
B Abortion
B Stem Cell Research
Acesso em linha: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Descrição
Resumo:Parthenogenesis is a form of asexual reproduction in which a gamete (ovum or sperm) develops without being fertilized. Tomer Jordi Chaffer uses parthenogenesis to challenge Don Marquis' future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion. According to Marquis, (1) what makes it morally wrong to kill us is that it would deprive us of a possible future that we might come to value—a future “like ours” (FLO) and (2) human fetuses are numerically identical to any adult human organism they may develop into, and thus have a FLO. Chaffer contends that if human ova are capable of parthenogenesis, then they would have a FLO, which contraception may deprive them of, but contends this is absurd. Bruce P. Blackshaw challenges Chaffer, contending sexually fertilized embryos are not identical to unfertilized ovum, but this would yield a more absurd implication, that fertilization deprives an ovum of a FLO! Here I show Marquis' account of identity rules out both Chaffer's and Blackshaw's accounts.
ISSN:1467-8519
Obras secundárias:Enthalten in: Bioethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/bioe.13289