Pareyson y «el mal (la nada) en Dios»: Notas para una comparación con la metafísica clásica
In his posthumous work Ontologia della libertà, Luigi Pareyson questions the problem of evil not so much from the point of view of human freedom, but rather in relation to that "abyss of freedom" that would be divine reality. Developing a thought that presents clear analogies with that of...
| Subtitles: | Pareyson and "Evil (Nothing) in God": Notes for a Comparison with Classical Metaphysics |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | Spanish |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Institution
2023
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| In: |
Cauriensia
Year: 2023, Volume: 18, Pages: 613-622 |
| Further subjects: | B
Ser
B Libertad B Nada B Dios B Mal |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | In his posthumous work Ontologia della libertà, Luigi Pareyson questions the problem of evil not so much from the point of view of human freedom, but rather in relation to that "abyss of freedom" that would be divine reality. Developing a thought that presents clear analogies with that of the last Schelling, Pareyson conceives of "nothing" as a moment of the Absolute, which is determined according to a dialectic of positive and negative within which the origin of being and the possibility of the existence of evil find their place. In this paper, reasons are given why this critique of any possible theodicy is untenable - even before its conception of the nature of evil - in its very logical-metaphysical "foundations," or in its attempt to free itself from metaphysical discourse on God. En su obra póstuma Ontologia della libertà, Luigi Pareyson cuestiona el problema del mal no tanto a partir de la libertad humana, sino en relación con ese "abismo de libertad" que sería la realidad divina. Desarrollando un pensamiento que presenta evidentes analogías con el del último Schelling, Pareyson concibe la "nada" como un momento del Absoluto, que se determina según una dialéctica de lo positivo y lo negativo dentro de la cual encuentran su lugar el origen del ser y la posibilidad de la existencia del mal. En este trabajo se exponen las razones por las que esta crítica a cualquier teodicea posible es insostenible -incluso antes de su concepción de la naturaleza del mal - en sus mismos "fundamentos" lógico-metafísicos, o en su intento de liberarse del discurso metafísico sobre Dios. |
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| ISSN: | 2340-4256 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Cauriensia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.17398/2340-4256.18.613 |