Causation and Divine Agency
God's regular causal activity is traditionally held to include his creation of the world, his conserving all created things in being and his concurrence with the causal activities of finite causes. Divine causation requires that God is an agent. In this paper, I apply E. J. Lowe's view of...
| Другие заглавия: | "Symposium On Divine Causation" |
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| Главный автор: | |
| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
2023
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| В: |
Philosophia Christi
Год: 2023, Том: 25, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 239-248 |
| Индексация IxTheo: | HB Ветхий Завет KAC Средневековье NBC Бог NBE Антропология VA Философия |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Итог: | God's regular causal activity is traditionally held to include his creation of the world, his conserving all created things in being and his concurrence with the causal activities of finite causes. Divine causation requires that God is an agent. In this paper, I apply E. J. Lowe's view of human agency to God. This application requires certain adjustments. Lowe takes it that when a person acts for reasons, these reasons are lacks of some kind. I argue that his account can apply to God if we think of the reasons for God’s action as connected to purposes rather than to needs. |
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| ISSN: | 2640-2580 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Philosophia Christi
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/pc202325224 |
