The formative years of Iran’s ‘jihadi field diplomacy’ in Azerbaijan
This study examines the formative years of Iran’s so-called ‘jihadi field diplomacy’ toward Azerbaijan during and after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. To accomplish this, I adopt a novel version of neoclassical realism, which considers the socially constructed nature of variables. The application o...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
2023
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| In: |
Politics, religion & ideology
Year: 2023, Volume: 24, Issue: 3, Pages: 398-425 |
| Further subjects: | B
Azerbaijan
B Iran B constructivist neoclassical realism B coup B Karabakh War |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | This study examines the formative years of Iran’s so-called ‘jihadi field diplomacy’ toward Azerbaijan during and after the First Nagorno-Karabakh War. To accomplish this, I adopt a novel version of neoclassical realism, which considers the socially constructed nature of variables. The application of constructivist neoclassical realism facilitates a deeper comprehension of the reasons and mechanisms behind Iran’s embrace of unconventional interventionist policies in Azerbaijan. I argue that Iran’s jihadi field diplomacy is characterized by two main features: the use of military tools to achieve foreign policy goals and a distinct leadership structure that operates independently of the government. Then I analyze three turning points that shaped Iran’s jihadi field diplomacy toward Azerbaijan. Firstly, after a failed diplomatic mediation between Yerevan and Baku in May 1992, Iran intensified its military and ideological efforts in Azerbaijan. Secondly, during the June 1993 coup, Iran supported pro-Russian coup leader Colonel Huseynov and sought to persuade him to collaborate with ex-Communist Aliyev against nationalist President Elchibey. Aliyev later perceived this initial cooperation as a serious ideological and military challenge. Lastly, the perceived threat and Iran’s Quds Force connections to the leaders of the subsequent military uprisings adversely affected bilateral relations between Iran and Azerbaijan. |
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| ISSN: | 2156-7697 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Politics, religion & ideology
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/21567689.2023.2262392 |