The Scope of the Means Principle
This paper focuses on Quong’s account of the scope of the means principle (the range of actions over which the special constraint on using a person applies). One of the key ideas underpinning Quong’s approach is that the means principle is downstream from an independent and morally prior account of...
| Published in: | Journal of moral philosophy |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
2023
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| In: |
Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2023, Volume: 20, Issue: 5/6, Pages: 439-460 |
| Further subjects: | B
Rights
B Distributive Justice B Harm B Jonathan Quong B defensive harm B means principle B Property |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | This paper focuses on Quong’s account of the scope of the means principle (the range of actions over which the special constraint on using a person applies). One of the key ideas underpinning Quong’s approach is that the means principle is downstream from an independent and morally prior account of our rights over the world and against one another. I raise three challenges to this ‘rights first’ approach. First, I consider Quong’s treatment of harmful omissions and argue that Quong’s view generates counter-intuitive results. Second, I argue that cases of harmful omissions raise problems for Quong’s claim that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility. Third, I consider Quong’s extension of the means principle to include uses of persons’ rightfully-owned property. I suggest that, contra Quong, questions of distributive justice are not morally prior to the ethics of defensive harm. Instead the two normative domains mutually inform one another. |
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| ISSN: | 1745-5243 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20213602 |