Egoism as a Problem for Robust Moral Realism
As a normative ethical theory, ethical egoism may seem compatible with the metaethical theory of moral realism. However, in this article, I will problematize such an assumption. The reason is that an important motivation for rejecting moral anti-realism by many moral realists—like Derek Parfit, Torb...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
MDPI
2023
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| Στο/Στη: |
Religions
Έτος: 2023, Τόμος: 14, Τεύχος: 10 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Moral Realism
B ethical egoism B Egoism B Metaethics |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Σύνοψη: | As a normative ethical theory, ethical egoism may seem compatible with the metaethical theory of moral realism. However, in this article, I will problematize such an assumption. The reason is that an important motivation for rejecting moral anti-realism by many moral realists—like Derek Parfit, Torbjörn Tännsjö, and Erik J. Wielenberg—is that such a view entails that not even cruel or horrendous acts are to be called wrong by any universal or objective standard. I suggest that this motivation also applies to the ethical theory of egoism, as it may imply that no one has any obligation to refrain from cruel or horrendous acts as long they are beneficial to the agent. On that basis, I will demonstrate that egoism is a problem for robust moral realists that also, to a large degree, is being overlooked. |
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| ISSN: | 2077-1444 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Religions
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3390/rel14101315 |