A Moral Argument Against Moral Realism
If what is morally right or wrong were ultimately a function of our opinions, then even such reprehensible actions as genocide and slavery would be morally right, had we approved of them. Many moral philosophers find this conclusion objectionably permissive, and to avoid it they posit a moral realit...
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
[2016]
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| В: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Год: 2016, Том: 19, Выпуск: 3, Страницы: 591-602 |
| Индексация IxTheo: | NCA Этика VA Философия |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Grounding
B Morality B Objectivity B Realism B Anti-realism B Metaethics |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Итог: | If what is morally right or wrong were ultimately a function of our opinions, then even such reprehensible actions as genocide and slavery would be morally right, had we approved of them. Many moral philosophers find this conclusion objectionably permissive, and to avoid it they posit a moral reality that exists independently of what anyone thinks. The notion of an independent moral reality has been subjected to meticulous metaphysical, epistemological and semantic criticism, but it is hardly ever examined from a moral point of view. In this essay I offer such a critique. I argue that the appeal to an independent moral reality as a ground for moral obligations constitutes a substantive moral mistake. However, I do not conclude from this that we must therefore embrace the opposite view that moral truths are ultimately dependent on our attitudes. Rather, I suggest that we reject both of these views and answer the classic meta-ethical question Is what we morally ought to do ultimately a function of our actual attitudes, or determined independently of them? with Neither. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Reference: | Kritik in "Melis Erdur's Moral Argument Against Moral Realism (2019)"
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| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-015-9676-3 |
