Explaining Epistemic Intuitions: From Intuitionist Particularism to Intuitionist Explanationism
In Radical Skepticism & Epistemic Intuition Michael Bergmann attempts to overcome the threat of radical skepticism as it arises in several different forms. The key to Bergmann’s response to skepticism is his method of intuitionist particularism wherein we give our intuitions about particular bel...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
2023
|
In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2023, Volume: 13, Issue: 2, Pages: 120-139 |
Further subjects: | B
Miner
B Particularism B Explanationism B Problem of the Criterion B Skepticism B Intuition B Phenomenal Explanationism |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | In Radical Skepticism & Epistemic Intuition Michael Bergmann attempts to overcome the threat of radical skepticism as it arises in several different forms. The key to Bergmann’s response to skepticism is his method of intuitionist particularism wherein we give our intuitions about particular beliefs being justified more weight than we do intuitions about the premises of arguments for skepticism. There are two general problems for Bergmann’s response to skepticism. First, he fails to accurately portray the key principle of the skeptical argument. As a result, much of the apparent motivation for looking to intuitionist particularism as opposed to other responses to skepticism is merely apparent. Second, intuitionist particularism faces significant problems when it comes to the Problem of the Criterion and the resolution of conflicting intuitions. However, a related intuitionist method, one incorporating explanationism, may be able to deliver what intuitionist particularism promises while avoiding its problems. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10045 |