Dignity and the Founding Myth of Bioethics
In this article, I reject the “principlism” of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress and argue that respect for autonomy is, and ought to be, the fundamental value of bioethics. To do so, I offer a reconstruction of what I call the field's “founding myth,” a genealogy that affords primacy to the ri...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
2023
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| In: |
The Hastings Center report
Anno: 2023, Volume: 53, Fascicolo: 2, Pagine: 26-35 |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Dignity
B principlism B Bioethics B four principles B Autonomy B Kant |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Riepilogo: | In this article, I reject the “principlism” of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress and argue that respect for autonomy is, and ought to be, the fundamental value of bioethics. To do so, I offer a reconstruction of what I call the field's “founding myth,” a genealogy that affords primacy to the right to be respected as a human being with dignity. Next, I examine the relationship between this basic right and a derivative right of autonomy. I suggest that principlism has promulgated an uncharitable understanding of respect for autonomy, one that ensures that the principle cannot occupy the central position I claim for it. Finally, I sketch a more plausible understanding of respect for autonomy and explore its implications. |
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| ISSN: | 1552-146X |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Hastings Center, The Hastings Center report
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1002/hast.1471 |
