Blameless Moral Criticism – the Case of Moral Disappointment

In discussing the ways in which we hold each other accountable for immoral conduct, philosophers have often focused on blame, aiming to specify adequate responses to wrongdoing. In contrast, theorizing about the ways we can appropriately respond to minor moral mistakes - i.e., criticizable conduct t...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Schönherr, Julius (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V 2023
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2023, Volume: 26, Issue: 1, Pages: 53-71
Further subjects:B Anger
B Disappointment
B Blame
B Responsibility
B Supererogation
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Summary:In discussing the ways in which we hold each other accountable for immoral conduct, philosophers have often focused on blame, aiming to specify adequate responses to wrongdoing. In contrast, theorizing about the ways we can appropriately respond to minor moral mistakes - i.e., criticizable conduct that is bad but not wrong - has largely been neglected. My first goal in this paper is, thus, to draw attention to this blind spot and argue that a separate account of blameless moral criticism is desirable. My second goal is to propose one way to explicate the contrast between blaming and blameless moral criticism in terms of the contrast between moral anger and moral disappointment: while moral anger, as many argue, is an appropriate response to moral wrongdoing, moral disappointment, but not moral anger, is an appropriate response to these minor moral mistakes.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contains:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10352-2