The Epistemic Responsibilities of Voters: Towards an Assertion-Based Account

In this paper, I contend that voters have epistemic responsibilities because voting is best understood as an act that bears assertoric force. More precisely, voters perform what I call an act of political advocacy whereby, like an asserter who states or affirms that something is the case, they state...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Giavazzi, Michele (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill 2023
In: Journal of moral philosophy
Year: 2023, Volume: 20, Issue: 1/2, Pages: 111-131
Further subjects:B norms of assertion
B epistemic responsibility
B Democratic theory
B ethics of voting
B epistemic democracy
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Summary:In this paper, I contend that voters have epistemic responsibilities because voting is best understood as an act that bears assertoric force. More precisely, voters perform what I call an act of political advocacy whereby, like an asserter who states or affirms that something is the case, they state or affirm that a certain course of political action is the one that should be followed or enacted.
Consequently, the performance of acts of political advocacy such as voting should be understood as bounded by epistemic norms mirroring those binding the act of assertion and yield epistemic responsibilities mirroring the ones required to satisfy these norms.
It is often claimed that democratic voters have epistemic responsibilities. However, it is not often specified why voters have such epistemic responsibilities.
ISSN:1745-5243
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of moral philosophy
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/17455243-20223791