Can fictionalists have a genuine emotional response to religious discourse?
The purpose of this article is to suggest that the fictionalist’s emotions toward religious discourse could be better supported than the current literature allows. By ‘fictionalist’ I mean those of whom interpret religious discourse as useful fiction. The threefold structure of the article will argu...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Taylor & Francis
2022
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| In: |
International journal of philosophy and theology
Year: 2022, Volume: 83, Issue: 5, Pages: 339-350 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Fiktionalismus
/ Religion
/ Discourse
/ Emotion
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBE Anthropology ZD Psychology |
| Further subjects: | B
Belief
B Religious fictionalism B alief B Philosophy of mind B Paradox-of-Fiction B Emotions |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | The purpose of this article is to suggest that the fictionalist’s emotions toward religious discourse could be better supported than the current literature allows. By ‘fictionalist’ I mean those of whom interpret religious discourse as useful fiction. The threefold structure of the article will argue that: (1) the concept of aliefs has been falsely equated with the concept of imagining, (2) the fictionalist ought to adopt a hybrid theory of emotions rather than a cognitive appraisal and, (3) if (1) and (2) are accepted, then key issues concerning the genuineness and appropriateness of emotions toward fictional entities can be overcome. I will conclude that something significant is at stake here, and that is whether or not the fictionalist’s emotions are deemed ‘real’ or not. Thus, to provide the best defence of the fictionalist’s emotions is to: (A) separate that which has been lumped together, that is: quasi emotions and alief-evoked emotions (B) argue for the hybrid account of emotions and, (C) defend the genuine and appropriate nature of fictional emotions. |
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| ISSN: | 2169-2335 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2022.2137561 |