E Pluribus Unum? Critical Comments on John Rawls' Concept of Overlapping Consensus
Taking as a starting point an example from Dutch politics, I make some critical statements on John Rawls' distinction between comprehensive doctrines and the political conception of justice as developed in his Political Liberalism. After an explanation of the concept ‘overlapping consensus’, I...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Routledge
2013
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| In: |
Religion, state & society
Year: 2013, Volume: 41, Issue: 2, Pages: 188-198 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Taking as a starting point an example from Dutch politics, I make some critical statements on John Rawls' distinction between comprehensive doctrines and the political conception of justice as developed in his Political Liberalism. After an explanation of the concept ‘overlapping consensus’, I show that Rawls' description of political liberalism as a set of principles independent of comprehensive doctrines is ambivalent. Rawls emphasises the dualism between comprehensive doctrines and the specific demands of politics, and he states that political arrangements are indifferent to truth or virtue. At the same time he pinpoints characteristics of political liberalism that at least suggest a moral dimension. By emphasising its separation from comprehensive doctrines he does not make it clear how the morality of political liberalism is related to the primary sources of morality. Rawls' sharp distinction between the two moralities makes it hard to imagine how the two are to be combined. He suggests an implausible picture of a person adhering to two different moralities. In the last part of the paper I elaborate practical consequences of Rawls' ambivalence. Taking the principle of free speech I show that Rawls underrates the importance of the sources of comprehensive doctrines in implementation of the values of political liberalism. Rawls does not do justice to the fact that the precise status and meaning of political liberal values must constantly be re-examined in direct exchange with what is going on in comprehensive doctrines. I end with a plea to pay more attention to the several ways in which comprehensive doctrines and liberal values can influence each other fruitfully. |
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| ISSN: | 1465-3974 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Religion, state & society
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/09637494.2013.804694 |