The Most Demanding Moral Capacity: Could Evolution Provide Any Base? = La capacidad moral más exigente : ¿Podría la evolución proporcionar alguna base?
The attempts to make moral and evolution compatible have assimilated moral capacity either with complex self-control in favour of one’s own goals or with spontaneous altruism. Those attempts face an easy problem, since those two senses of moral are adaptively advantageous resources. But let us focus...
Subtitles: | La capacidad moral más exigente |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Facultad de Teología San Isidoro de Sevilla
2022
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In: |
Isidorianum
Year: 2022, Volume: 31, Issue: 2, Pages: 91-126 |
Further subjects: | B
altruismo espontáneo
B contenidos mentales de los otros B discurso dirigido a uno mismo B Teoría de la Mente B expectativas vicarias |
Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Summary: | The attempts to make moral and evolution compatible have assimilated moral capacity either with complex self-control in favour of one’s own goals or with spontaneous altruism. Those attempts face an easy problem, since those two senses of moral are adaptively advantageous resources. But let us focus on the decisions made in favour of another person which the subject, when making them, feels are contrary to his own goals: Could a base for this capacity arise in evolution, however poor and weak? I propose that such base, while it is not an adaptive advantage but quite the opposite, arises from the convergence between two abilities which in their respective origins were adaptively very advantageous: the advanced mode of ‘theory-of-mind’ (ToM) and inner speech. |
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ISSN: | 2660-7743 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Isidorianum
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.46543/ISID.2231.1056 |