‘Dirty Hands’: Guilt and Regret in Moral Reasoning
Nigel Biggar argues against ‘dirty hands’ reasoning for two reasons. The first is that dirty hands reasoning is paradoxical. The second is that ‘dirt’ in dirty hands is often—and wrongly—conceived as guilt. According to Biggar, the dirt should instead be understood as regret. In this article, I defe...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Sage
2023
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| En: |
Studies in Christian ethics
Año: 2023, Volumen: 36, Número: 1, Páginas: 107-122 |
| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | NCB Ética individual ZD Psicología |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Regret
B Moral emotions B Dirty Hands B Guilt B Nigel Biggar B Moral Reasoning |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | Nigel Biggar argues against ‘dirty hands’ reasoning for two reasons. The first is that dirty hands reasoning is paradoxical. The second is that ‘dirt’ in dirty hands is often—and wrongly—conceived as guilt. According to Biggar, the dirt should instead be understood as regret. In this article, I defend dirty hands reasoning against both criticisms. On the one hand, I argue that dirty hands reasoning is not necessarily paradoxical. On the other, I argue that, because guilt, more than regret, is meant to motivate the agent we should prefer a prima facie interpretation of the ‘dirt’ in dirty hands as guilt instead of regret. |
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| ISSN: | 0953-9468 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Studies in Christian ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/09539468221116300 |