‘Dirty Hands’: Guilt and Regret in Moral Reasoning
Nigel Biggar argues against ‘dirty hands’ reasoning for two reasons. The first is that dirty hands reasoning is paradoxical. The second is that ‘dirt’ in dirty hands is often—and wrongly—conceived as guilt. According to Biggar, the dirt should instead be understood as regret. In this article, I defe...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Sage
2023
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| Στο/Στη: |
Studies in Christian ethics
Έτος: 2023, Τόμος: 36, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 107-122 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NCB Ατομική Ηθική ZD Ψυχολογία |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Regret
B Moral emotions B Dirty Hands B Guilt B Nigel Biggar B Moral Reasoning |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | Nigel Biggar argues against ‘dirty hands’ reasoning for two reasons. The first is that dirty hands reasoning is paradoxical. The second is that ‘dirt’ in dirty hands is often—and wrongly—conceived as guilt. According to Biggar, the dirt should instead be understood as regret. In this article, I defend dirty hands reasoning against both criticisms. On the one hand, I argue that dirty hands reasoning is not necessarily paradoxical. On the other, I argue that, because guilt, more than regret, is meant to motivate the agent we should prefer a prima facie interpretation of the ‘dirt’ in dirty hands as guilt instead of regret. |
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| ISSN: | 0953-9468 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Studies in Christian ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1177/09539468221116300 |