Strategic earnings announcement timing and fraud detection

This study investigates whether firms with fraudulent financial reporting time their earnings announcements strategically and finds that fraudulent firms are more likely to disclose their earnings in the after-market hours during their fraud periods to postpone fraud detection. Cross-sectional tests...

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Bibliographic Details
Authors: Xin, Cheng (Author) ; Palmon, Dan 1941- (Author) ; Yang, Yinan (Author) ; Yin, Cheng (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer 2023
In: Journal of business ethics
Year: 2023, Volume: 182, Issue: 3, Pages: 851-874
Further subjects:B Insider trading
B Bundled earnings
B Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
B Earnings announcement
B Fraudulent financial reporting
B Voluntary Disclosure
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Description
Summary:This study investigates whether firms with fraudulent financial reporting time their earnings announcements strategically and finds that fraudulent firms are more likely to disclose their earnings in the after-market hours during their fraud periods to postpone fraud detection. Cross-sectional tests show that firms with lower visibility are more likely to adopt and benefit from this timing strategy. In addition, fraudulent firms are found to time their conference calls strategically and package their earning news with forecasts to flood the market with information and lower the fraud detection rate. Results also show that unethical managers may benefit from insider trading when their firms use a timing strategy to lower the detection rate. This study sheds light on a potential strategy that unethical managers may adopt to camouflage their fraudulent financial reporting. These results are robust to a variety of settings of samples and model specifications.
ISSN:1573-0697
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10551-021-05029-2