The Binding Problem for Strong Experiential Monism

In this article, I explicate a new problem for a variant of panpsychism, strong experiential monism, that is the view that all being is experiential. I contrast the view with weak experiential monism, a softer variant that allows for non-experiential bare particulars to act as the carriers of proper...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Heikkinen, Santtu (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Netherlands 2022
In: Sophia
Year: 2022, Volume: 61, Issue: 4, Pages: 795-809
Further subjects:B Monadology
B Property monism
B Intrinsic natures
B Powerful qualities
B Property dualism
B Objective idealism
B Panpsychism
B Dual-aspect monism
B Experiential monism
Online Access: Volltext (kostenfrei)

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