How to Deal with Counter-Examples to Common Morality Theory: A Surprising Result
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress are confident that their four principles—respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice—are globally applicable to the sorts of issues that arise in biomedical ethics, in part because those principles form part of the common morality (a set of gener...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
2022
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In: |
Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
Year: 2022, Volume: 31, Issue: 2, Pages: 185-191 |
Further subjects: | B
counter-examples
B principlism B four principles approach B Common morality B global applicability thesis |
Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Summary: | Tom Beauchamp and James Childress are confident that their four principles—respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice—are globally applicable to the sorts of issues that arise in biomedical ethics, in part because those principles form part of the common morality (a set of general norms to which all morally committed persons subscribe). Inevitably, however, the question arises of how the principlist ought to respond when presented with apparent counter-examples to this thesis. I examine a number of strategies the principlist might adopt in order to retain common morality theory in the face of supposed counter-examples. I conclude that only a strategy that takes a non-realist view of the common morality’s principles is viable. Unfortunately, such a view is likely not to appeal to the principlist. |
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ISSN: | 1469-2147 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S096318012100058X |