Why is an Egg Donor a Genetic Parent, but not a Mitochondrial Donor?
As new ways of reproducing emerge, advancing technologies are forcing us to rethink our old ideas of what it means to be a genetic parent. Why should some processes qualify as “reproduction” and others should not? To illustrate the practical impact of providing a defensible account of reproduction,...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2019
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| In: |
Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
Year: 2019, Volume: 28, Issue: 3, Pages: 488-498 |
| Further subjects: | B
Reproduction
B mitochondrial donation (mtDNA) B genetic parent |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | As new ways of reproducing emerge, advancing technologies are forcing us to rethink our old ideas of what it means to be a genetic parent. Why should some processes qualify as “reproduction” and others should not? To illustrate the practical impact of providing a defensible account of reproduction, the author examines the case of mitochondrial donation (mtDNA) and calls for a philosophical argument to bring clarity to exactly what we mean by ‘reproduction.’ |
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| ISSN: | 1469-2147 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0963180119000410 |