Is It Desirable to Be Able to Do the Undesirable? Moral Bioenhancement and the Little Alex Problem
It has been argued that moral bioenhancement is desirable even if it would make it impossible for us to do what is morally required. Others find this apparent loss of freedom deplorable. However, it is difficult to see how a world in which there is no moral evil can plausibly be regarded as worse th...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
2017
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| Em: |
Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
Ano: 2017, Volume: 26, Número: 3, Páginas: 365-376 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
moral enhancement
B Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu B A Clockwork Orange B Juergen Habermas B Freedom |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Resumo: | It has been argued that moral bioenhancement is desirable even if it would make it impossible for us to do what is morally required. Others find this apparent loss of freedom deplorable. However, it is difficult to see how a world in which there is no moral evil can plausibly be regarded as worse than a world in which people are not only free to do evil, but also where they actually do it, which would commit us to the seemingly paradoxical view that, under certain circumstances, the bad can be better than the good. Notwithstanding, this view is defended here. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-2147 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S096318011600102X |