The Principle of Procreative Beneficence: Old Arguments and A New Challenge

In the last ten years, there have been a number of attempts to refute Julian Savulescu's Principle of Procreative Beneficence; a principle which claims that parents have a moral obligation to have the best child that they can possibly have. So far, no arguments against this principle have succe...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor principal: Hotke, Andrew (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
Verificar disponibilidad: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publicado: 2014
En: Bioethics
Año: 2014, Volumen: 28, Número: 5, Páginas: 255-262
Otras palabras clave:B Morality
B Rebecca Bennett
B procreative beneficence
B Julian Savulescu
B de Melo-Martin
B PGD
B Robert Sparrow
Acceso en línea: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Descripción
Sumario:In the last ten years, there have been a number of attempts to refute Julian Savulescu's Principle of Procreative Beneficence; a principle which claims that parents have a moral obligation to have the best child that they can possibly have. So far, no arguments against this principle have succeeded at refuting it. This paper tries to explain the shortcomings of some of the more notable arguments against this principle. I attempt to break down the argument for the principle and in doing so, I explain what is needed to properly refute it. This helps me show how and why the arguments of Rebecca Bennett, Sarah Stoller and others fail to refute the principle. Afterwards, I offer a new challenge to the principle. I attack what I understand to be a fundamental premise of the argument, a premise which has been overlooked in the literature written about this principle. I argue that there is no reason to suppose, as Savulescu does, that morality requires us to do what we have most reason to do. If we reject this premise, as I believe we have reason to do, the argument for Procreative Beneficence fails.
ISSN:1467-8519
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: Bioethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8519.2012.01999.x