Refusing to Treat Sexual Dysfunction in Sex Offenders
This article examines one kind of conscientious refusal: the refusal of healthcare professionals to treat sexual dysfunction in individuals with a history of sexual offending. According to what I call the orthodoxy, such refusal is invariably impermissible, whereas at least one other kind of conscie...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
2017
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| In: |
Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
Year: 2017, Volume: 26, Issue: 1, Pages: 143-158 |
| Further subjects: | B
agent-relativity
B Discrimination B sexual dysfunction B conscientious refusal B Complicity B Conscientious Objection B indirect discrimination B statistical discrimination B treatment refusal B testosterone therapy B SEX offenders |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | This article examines one kind of conscientious refusal: the refusal of healthcare professionals to treat sexual dysfunction in individuals with a history of sexual offending. According to what I call the orthodoxy, such refusal is invariably impermissible, whereas at least one other kind of conscientious refusal—refusal to offer abortion services—is not. I seek to put pressure on the orthodoxy by (1) motivating the view that either both kinds of conscientious refusal are permissible or neither is, and (2) critiquing two attempts to buttress it. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-2147 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0963180116000712 |