Doing Good, Choosing Freely: How Moral Enhancement Can Be Compatible with Individual Freedom

Moral enhancement has been accused of curtailing human freedoms. In this article, I suggest the opposite: moral enhancement and individual freedom can go hand in hand. The first section defines freedom, enhancement, and morality and argues that only a naturalistic account of morality allows for the...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Brostoff, Joshua M. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Cambridge Univ. Press 2018
In: Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
Year: 2018, Volume: 27, Issue: 4, Pages: 698-709
Further subjects:B Morality
B moral enhancement
B Virtue Ethics
B Freedom
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

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