Doing Good, Choosing Freely: How Moral Enhancement Can Be Compatible with Individual Freedom

Moral enhancement has been accused of curtailing human freedoms. In this article, I suggest the opposite: moral enhancement and individual freedom can go hand in hand. The first section defines freedom, enhancement, and morality and argues that only a naturalistic account of morality allows for the...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Brostoff, Joshua M. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Cambridge Univ. Press 2018
In: Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
Year: 2018, Volume: 27, Issue: 4, Pages: 698-709
Further subjects:B Morality
B moral enhancement
B Virtue Ethics
B Freedom
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Description
Summary:Moral enhancement has been accused of curtailing human freedoms. In this article, I suggest the opposite: moral enhancement and individual freedom can go hand in hand. The first section defines freedom, enhancement, and morality and argues that only a naturalistic account of morality allows for the concept of enhancement. The second section looks at ways that freedom may be threatened by moral enhancement, especially by the method of implementation, the creation of new externalities, or the limitation of volitional options. I argue that virtue ethics offers the safest model for moral enhancement. The third section describes ways in which moral enhancement can be achieved while maintaining, or even increasing, individual freedom. Such methods include shifting of the moral axis, replacing vicious options with virtuous ones, and increasing the number of volitional options available. The article concludes in the fourth section by arguing that the technology and techniques that allow us moral enhancement are likely to be the same ones that allow greater freedom than we already enjoy.
ISSN:1469-2147
Contains:Enthalten in: Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/S096318011800018X