In Vitro Gametogenesis and the Creation of ‘Designer Babies’
Research into the development of stem cell-derived (SCD) gametes in humans, otherwise known as in vitro gametogenesis (IVG), is largely motivated by reproductive aims. Especially, the goal of establishing genetic parenthood by means of SCD-gametes is considered an important aim. However, like other...
| Main Author: | |
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| Contributors: | ; ; ; |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2019
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| In: |
Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
Year: 2019, Volume: 28, Issue: 3, Pages: 499-508 |
| Further subjects: | B
Stem Cells
B genetic parenthood B artificial gametes B designer babies B Assisted Reproduction B gamete derivation B in vitro gametogenesis B gene editing |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Research into the development of stem cell-derived (SCD) gametes in humans, otherwise known as in vitro gametogenesis (IVG), is largely motivated by reproductive aims. Especially, the goal of establishing genetic parenthood by means of SCD-gametes is considered an important aim. However, like other applications in the field of assisted reproduction, this technology evokes worries about the possibility of creating so-called ‘designer babies.’ In this paper, we investigate various ways in which SCD-gametes could be used to create such preference-matched offspring, and what this would mean for the acceptability of IVG, if it is premised that it is morally problematic to ‘design’ offspring. We argue that IVG might facilitate the creation of preference-matched offspring, but conclude that this should not undermine the moral acceptability of IVG altogether—even if one concedes the premise that creating ‘designer babies’ is morally problematic. In the light of this, we also point at a possible inconsistency for a position that condemns the creation of ‘designer offspring,’ while accepting the various endeavors to have genetically related offspring. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-2147 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Cambridge quarterly of healthcare ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0963180119000422 |