Arguments from Nothing: God and Quantum Cosmology
Abstract. This essay explores a simple argument for a Ground of Being, objections to it, and limitations on it. It is nonsensical to refer to Nothing in the sense of utter absence, hence nothing can be claimed to come from Nothing. If, as it seems, the universe, or any physical ensemble containing i...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
2009
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| Em: |
Zygon
Ano: 2009, Volume: 44, Número: 4, Páginas: 777-796 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
past-finite
B David Hume B past-eternal B Creation B Hartle-Hawking B Universe B no-boundary proposal B Creator B quantum gravity B Nothing B Inflação B quantum cosmology B origin of universe B Cosmology B Big Bang B Cosmological Argument B Teleological Argument B Alex Vilenkin B God |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Não eletrônico
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| Resumo: | Abstract. This essay explores a simple argument for a Ground of Being, objections to it, and limitations on it. It is nonsensical to refer to Nothing in the sense of utter absence, hence nothing can be claimed to come from Nothing. If, as it seems, the universe, or any physical ensemble containing it, is past-finite, it must be caused by an uncaused Ground. Speculative many-worlds, pocket universes and multiverses do not affect this argument, but the quantum cosmologies of Alex Vilenkin, and J. B. Hartle and Stephen Hawking, which claim that the universe came from literally nothing, would. I argue that their novel project cannot work for reasons both physical (their “nothing” is actually a vacuum state governed by eternal physical laws) and methodological (physical theory cannot explain the emergence of the physical per se). Thus my argument stands. However, as David Hume showed, a posteriori arguments like mine infer a creation, and Creator, of a certain character, namely, a stochastic concept of creation and a panentheistic, partly physical Creator lacking omniscience and omnipotence. Rather than undermining the cosmological argument, as Hume intended, these limitations liberate the concept of the Ground from unnecessary problems, as Hartshorne suggested. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9744 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Zygon
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9744.2009.01033.x |
