A Procedural, Pragmatist Account of Ethical Objectivity
This article offers a procedural, pragmatist account of objectivity in the domain of the good that is inspired by pragmatic and feminist critiques of objectivity in philosophy of science and epistemology. I begin by asking first what we want to capture—or ought to want to capture—with a notion of et...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
2013
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| In: |
Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal
Year: 2013, Volume: 23, Issue: 2, Pages: 169-200 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | This article offers a procedural, pragmatist account of objectivity in the domain of the good that is inspired by pragmatic and feminist critiques of objectivity in philosophy of science and epistemology. I begin by asking first what we want to capture—or ought to want to capture—with a notion of ethical objectivity and in answer to this question I identify four “points” to ethical objectivity: undergirding the possibility of mistakenness, making genuine disagreement possible, making sense of our appreciation of the ethical perspectives of others, and making possible a sense of ethical improvement or learning. I then lay out a process-based account of objectivity in ethics that makes good on the four points I have identified. Finally, I consider worries related to convergence, bias, and ontology and defend the procedural, pragmatist account in light of those potential objections. |
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| ISSN: | 1086-3249 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1353/ken.2013.0005 |