How Not to Argue for Selective Reproductive Procedures
, Many bioethicists try to secure a moral requirement to select against disability, while wishing to avoid denigrating disabled people. Dan Brock's arguments are representative of this attempt. Brock argues that the harm of giving birth to a disabled child when an able child could be had in its...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
2017
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In: |
Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal
Year: 2017, Volume: 27, Issue: 2, Pages: 185-215 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | , Many bioethicists try to secure a moral requirement to select against disability, while wishing to avoid denigrating disabled people. Dan Brock's arguments are representative of this attempt. Brock argues that the harm of giving birth to a disabled child when an able child could be had in its stead is a "nonperson-affecting harm." The harm is creating a world with less opportunity and more diminishment of opportunity. I argue that the presumptions that a life with disability is ceteris paribus a worse life, and that there is an inherent badness in living with a disability are contestable and fail to provide an argument that avoids the objections that disability scholars have voiced to reproductive selection against disability. |
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ISSN: | 1086-3249 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1353/ken.2017.0015 |