Theory Skepticism and Moral Dilemmas
, Moral-theory skepticism not an option in any sort of thinking that could actually be used in resolving dilemmas in applied ethics, since its characteristic doctrines entail positions that in practice often will lead to a kind of paralysis in moral reasoning, where persons faced with having to deci...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
2002
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In: |
Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal
Year: 2002, Volume: 12, Issue: 3, Pages: 279-298 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | , Moral-theory skepticism not an option in any sort of thinking that could actually be used in resolving dilemmas in applied ethics, since its characteristic doctrines entail positions that in practice often will lead to a kind of paralysis in moral reasoning, where persons faced with having to decide what to do in particularly difficult cases are unable to rule out the most implausible conclusions. Moral-theory skepticism thus makes it difficult to formulate decision-making procedures that will provide guidance in action and, so, seems not to succeed as a fully coherent account of moral reasoning. |
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ISSN: | 1086-3249 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1353/ken.2002.0020 |