Environmental Justice, Values, and Scientific Expertise
This essay compares two philosophical proposals concerning the relation between values and science, both of which reject the value-free ideal but nevertheless place restrictions on how values and science should interact. The first of these proposals relies on a distinction between the direct and ind...
Authors: | ; |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press
2012
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In: |
Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal
Year: 2012, Volume: 22, Issue: 2, Pages: 163-182 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Summary: | This essay compares two philosophical proposals concerning the relation between values and science, both of which reject the value-free ideal but nevertheless place restrictions on how values and science should interact. The first of these proposals relies on a distinction between the direct and indirect roles of values, while the second emphasizes instead a distinction between epistemic and nonepistemic values. We consider these two proposals in connection with a case study of disputed research on the topic of environmental justice and argue that the second proposal has several advantages over the first. |
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ISSN: | 1086-3249 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Kennedy Institute of Ethics journal
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1353/ken.2012.0010 |