There Is No Rawlsian Theory of Corporate Governance

The major aim of this article is to show that John Rawls’s theory of justice cannot be applied effectively to questions of business ethics and corporate governance. I begin with a reading of Rawls that emphasizes both the critical and pragmatic nature of his theory. In the second section I look more...

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Κύριος συγγραφέας: Singer, Abraham (Συγγραφέας)
Τύπος μέσου: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο
Γλώσσα:Αγγλικά
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: HBZ Gateway
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Έκδοση: Cambridge Univ. Press 2015
Στο/Στη: Business ethics quarterly
Έτος: 2015, Τόμος: 25, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 65-92
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά:B Political Philosophy and Business Ethics
B Basic Structure
B Εταιρική διακυβέρνηση
B Rawls
B Normative Stakeholder Theory
Διαθέσιμο Online: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Περιγραφή
Σύνοψη:The major aim of this article is to show that John Rawls’s theory of justice cannot be applied effectively to questions of business ethics and corporate governance. I begin with a reading of Rawls that emphasizes both the critical and pragmatic nature of his theory. In the second section I look more closely at the notion of society’s “basic structure” and its place within Rawls’s theory. In the third section, I argue that “the corporation” cannot be understood as part of this basic structure and is not, therefore, a subject of justice for Rawls or his interpreters. Finally, I show that Rawls’s inability to speak to the corporation is a weakness, regardless of one’s particular view on the corporation. I conclude by considering what Rawls’s theory helps us to understand about the problems involved in integrating corporate governance, business ethics, and political philosophy.
ISSN:2153-3326
Περιλαμβάνει:Enthalten in: Business ethics quarterly
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/beq.2015.1