Fiduciary Duty, Risk, and Shareholder Desert
A common moral argument is that shareholders have a special status because of risk when considering the duties of corporate management. The privileges of this status usually include the idea that management should adopt the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. We argue that modern financial theory...
| Authors: | ; |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
2018
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| Em: |
Business ethics quarterly
Ano: 2018, Volume: 28, Número: 2, Páginas: 203-218 |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Parte interessada
B Fiduciary Duty B shareholder B capital asset pricing model B Desert |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Resumo: | A common moral argument is that shareholders have a special status because of risk when considering the duties of corporate management. The privileges of this status usually include the idea that management should adopt the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. We argue that modern financial theory demonstrates that this argument should be modified by the recognition of a principle of desert, the shareholder desert principle (SDP). Financial theory can usefully circumscribe the duty owed to shareholders and the extent to which risk bearing justifies a claim on corporate value. When combined with the SDP, the result provides management with a guideline for what is owed to shareholders before other stakeholder non-contractual claims may be satisfied. As such, our approach provides management with some guidance through the thicket of competing stakeholder claims. |
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| ISSN: | 2153-3326 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Business ethics quarterly
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/beq.2017.47 |