Fiduciary Duty, Risk, and Shareholder Desert
A common moral argument is that shareholders have a special status because of risk when considering the duties of corporate management. The privileges of this status usually include the idea that management should adopt the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. We argue that modern financial theory...
| Autores principales: | ; |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
2018
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| En: |
Business ethics quarterly
Año: 2018, Volumen: 28, Número: 2, Páginas: 203-218 |
| Otras palabras clave: | B
Fiduciary Duty
B Parte interesada B shareholder B capital asset pricing model B Desert |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | A common moral argument is that shareholders have a special status because of risk when considering the duties of corporate management. The privileges of this status usually include the idea that management should adopt the goal of maximizing shareholder wealth. We argue that modern financial theory demonstrates that this argument should be modified by the recognition of a principle of desert, the shareholder desert principle (SDP). Financial theory can usefully circumscribe the duty owed to shareholders and the extent to which risk bearing justifies a claim on corporate value. When combined with the SDP, the result provides management with a guideline for what is owed to shareholders before other stakeholder non-contractual claims may be satisfied. As such, our approach provides management with some guidance through the thicket of competing stakeholder claims. |
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| ISSN: | 2153-3326 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Business ethics quarterly
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/beq.2017.47 |