Contracts and Hierarchies: A Moral Examination of Economic Theories of the Firm
An influential set of economic theories argue that the firm is a nexus of contracts that institute a hierarchy to overcome the problems of incomplete contracting in the market. However, the economic theory of the firm as a hierarchy violates the moral requirement to respect the autonomy of those who...
Auteur principal: | |
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Type de support: | Électronique Article |
Langue: | Anglais |
Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publié: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
2018
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Dans: |
Business ethics quarterly
Année: 2018, Volume: 28, Numéro: 2, Pages: 153-173 |
Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Hierarchy
B theory of the firm B Law and economics B Autonomy B Gouvernement d'entreprise |
Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Résumé: | An influential set of economic theories argue that the firm is a nexus of contracts that institute a hierarchy to overcome the problems of incomplete contracting in the market. However, the economic theory of the firm as a hierarchy violates the moral requirement to respect the autonomy of those who contract into the firm. The internal logic of the theory depends on a morally unacceptable abdication of a part of the employee’s capacity to set her own ends in the future. So a different theory is needed to understand the nature and purpose of the firm. The development of such a theory can benefit from business ethicists engaging with existing economic theories of the firm to explore concepts like contracts, agency, and property. |
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ISSN: | 2153-3326 |
Contient: | Enthalten in: Business ethics quarterly
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/beq.2017.54 |