Contracts and Hierarchies: A Moral Examination of Economic Theories of the Firm

An influential set of economic theories argue that the firm is a nexus of contracts that institute a hierarchy to overcome the problems of incomplete contracting in the market. However, the economic theory of the firm as a hierarchy violates the moral requirement to respect the autonomy of those who...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Lee, Jooho (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Cambridge Univ. Press 2018
Dans: Business ethics quarterly
Année: 2018, Volume: 28, Numéro: 2, Pages: 153-173
Sujets non-standardisés:B Hierarchy
B theory of the firm
B Law and economics
B Autonomy
B Gouvernement d'entreprise
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Description
Résumé:An influential set of economic theories argue that the firm is a nexus of contracts that institute a hierarchy to overcome the problems of incomplete contracting in the market. However, the economic theory of the firm as a hierarchy violates the moral requirement to respect the autonomy of those who contract into the firm. The internal logic of the theory depends on a morally unacceptable abdication of a part of the employee’s capacity to set her own ends in the future. So a different theory is needed to understand the nature and purpose of the firm. The development of such a theory can benefit from business ethicists engaging with existing economic theories of the firm to explore concepts like contracts, agency, and property.
ISSN:2153-3326
Contient:Enthalten in: Business ethics quarterly
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1017/beq.2017.54