The Possibility of Virtue

To have a virtue is to possess a certain kind of trait of character that is appropriate in pursuing the moral good at which the virtue aims. Human beings are assumed to be capable of attaining those traits. Yet, a number of scholars are skeptical about the very existence of such character traits. Th...

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Autor principal: Alzola, Miguel (Autor)
Tipo de documento: Electrónico Artículo
Lenguaje:Inglés
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publicado: 2012
En: Business ethics quarterly
Año: 2012, Volumen: 22, Número: 2, Páginas: 377-404
Otras palabras clave:B Situationism
B Business Ethics
B Character
B Virtue
B Moral Psychology
Acceso en línea: Presumably Free Access
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Sumario:To have a virtue is to possess a certain kind of trait of character that is appropriate in pursuing the moral good at which the virtue aims. Human beings are assumed to be capable of attaining those traits. Yet, a number of scholars are skeptical about the very existence of such character traits. They claim a sizable amount of empirical evidence in their support. This article is concerned with the existence and explanatory power of character as a way to assess the possibility of achieving moral virtue, with particular attention paid to business context. I aim to unsettle the so-called situationist challenge to virtue ethics. In the course of this article, I shall defend four claims, namely, that virtues are more than just behavioral dispositions, that at least some virtues may not be unitary traits, that psychologists cannot infer virtues from overt behavior, and that the situationist data do not account for the observational equivalence of traits. Since it rests on a misconception of what virtue is, the situationist objection remains unconvincing.
ISSN:2153-3326
Obras secundarias:Enthalten in: Business ethics quarterly
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.5840/beq201222224