When and how underdog expectations promote cheating behavior: the roles of need fulfillment and general self-efficacy
Extant research has demonstrated that underdog expectations - individuals’ perceptions that others view them as unlikely to succeed - can have positive implications for motivating performance. In this paper, we draw on self-determination theory to examine how and when underdog expectations can have...
| Authors: | ; ; ; |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer
2022
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| In: |
Journal of business ethics
Year: 2022, Volume: 181, Issue: 2, Pages: 375-395 |
| Further subjects: | B
Self-determination theory
B Low expectation B Aufsatz in Zeitschrift B Cheating behavior B Underdog B Need fulfillment |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | Extant research has demonstrated that underdog expectations - individuals’ perceptions that others view them as unlikely to succeed - can have positive implications for motivating performance. In this paper, we draw on self-determination theory to examine how and when underdog expectations can have detrimental consequences for both the employee and the organization. Specifically, we propose that underdog expectations can decrease employees’ need fulfillment, which in turn leads to more cheating behavior. Furthermore, we theorize that the indirect effect of underdog expectations on cheating behavior via need fulfillment is weaker when general self-efficacy is high than when it is low. Results from two studies using complementary designs support our predictions. Overall, our research demonstrates a potential dark side to underdog expectations and also contributes to the behavioral ethics literature. |
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| ISSN: | 1573-0697 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10551-021-04976-0 |