The Perspectivity of Feeling: Process Panpsychism and the Explanatory Gap
For mainstream analytic philosophy of mind, the exphnatory gap between first- and third-person accounts of consciousness derives from the inaccessibility of special, "experiential" properties of conscious minds. Within this framework, panpsychism is simply the claim that these special prop...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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| Published: |
University of Illinois Press
2009
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| In: |
Process studies
Year: 2009, Volume: 38, Issue: 2, Pages: 189-206 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | For mainstream analytic philosophy of mind, the exphnatory gap between first- and third-person accounts of consciousness derives from the inaccessibility of special, "experiential" properties of conscious minds. Within this framework, panpsychism is simply the claim that these special properties are everywhere. In contrast, process panpsychism understands the explanatory gap in terms of the particularity of feeling. While the particularity of feeling cannot be captured by third-person accounts, for this very reason it is amenable to understanding consciousness as an evolutionary process. Thus it may turn out that the elusiveness of feeling is essential to its functionality. |
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| ISSN: | 2154-3682 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Process studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2307/44798486 |