Normative Analysis in Judicial Determination of Public Policy
Judges are seldom content merely to annul the particular solution before them; they do not, indeed, they may not, say that taking all things into consideration, the legislators' solution is too strong for the judicial stomach. On the contrary they wrap up their veto in a protective veil of adje...
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
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Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
1985
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In: |
Journal of law and religion
Year: 1985, Volume: 3, Issue: 1, Pages: 77-115 |
Online Access: |
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Summary: | Judges are seldom content merely to annul the particular solution before them; they do not, indeed, they may not, say that taking all things into consideration, the legislators' solution is too strong for the judicial stomach. On the contrary they wrap up their veto in a protective veil of adjectives such as ‘arbitrary,’ ‘artificial,’ ‘normal,’ ‘reasonable,’ ‘inherent,’ ‘fundamental,’ or ‘essential,’ whose office usually, though quite innocently, is to disguise what they are doing and impute it to a derivation far more impressive than their personal preferences, which are all that in fact lie behind the decision. |
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ISSN: | 2163-3088 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of law and religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2307/1051349 |