Laycock's Substantive Neutrality and Nuechterlein's Free Exercise Test: Implications of Their Convergence for the Religion Clauses
A popular conception about the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is that the Free Exercise Clause is in tension, or conflict, with the Establishment Clause. Accommodation under the Free Exercise Clause seems, in many cases, to conflict with the establishment clause principle that government mu...
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
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| Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
1993
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| In: |
Journal of law and religion
Year: 1993, Volume: 10, Issue: 2, Pages: 467-491 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | A popular conception about the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment is that the Free Exercise Clause is in tension, or conflict, with the Establishment Clause. Accommodation under the Free Exercise Clause seems, in many cases, to conflict with the establishment clause principle that government must neither advance nor favor any religious practice or belief. In response to this seeming tension between the two mandates, Jonathan Nuechterlein, in a recent article, advances the theory that contrary to popular belief, the two clauses are not in conflict. Rather, the mandates of the two clauses fit together like "pieces in a jigsaw puzzle." The traditional test of required accommodation under the Free Exercise clause5 employed by the courts define the outer limits of what is allowed under the Establishment Clause.In what may at first seem to be only a marginally related work, Professor Douglas Laycock tackles the task of formulating a workable definition of governmental neutrality towards religion "neutrality" has under the clauses. Recognizing that the term been repeatedly used and "misused" by both courts and commentators, and recognizing the prevalence of a "formal" definition of neutrality that is at odds with religious liberty," Laycock lays the groundwork for a systematic definition of that term, and proposes a certain "substantive" definition that best promotes religious liberty. |
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| ISSN: | 2163-3088 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of law and religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2307/1051144 |