Why is a House Nothing More than Stones and Pieces of Wood?: Ockham's Argument and its Critics
Is an artefact something distinct from the natural things composing it? For example, is a chair a thing distinct from the pieces of wood? Medieval artefact realists argued for an affirmative reply to this question, whereas artefact nominalists argued for a negative reply. This paper focuses on one o...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Peeters
2022
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| In: |
Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales
Year: 2022, Volume: 89, Issue: 1, Pages: 109-144 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | Is an artefact something distinct from the natural things composing it? For example, is a chair a thing distinct from the pieces of wood? Medieval artefact realists argued for an affirmative reply to this question, whereas artefact nominalists argued for a negative reply. This paper focuses on one of many facets of this medieval debate. It investigates William of Ockham’s influential argument for the thesis that artefacts made by composition, such as houses, cannot be anything more than their component parts. The paper also analyses the critical reception of Ockham’s argument, with special focus on the works of Walter Burley and Paul of Venice. I show that Ockham’s argument is based on plausible premises. I also demonstrate that the reply that Ockham’s critics offer to his argument is unconvincing, so that Ockham seems to have an upper hand in the debate.\n4207 \n4207 |
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| ISSN: | 1783-1717 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/RTPM.89.1.3290730 |