The Realm of entia rationis and its Boundaries: Hervaeus Natalis on Objective Being

Hervaeus Natalis distinguishes two types of items that can have esse obiective in the intellect: objects of acts of intellection (man, this cat, etc.) and properties unapprehended by these acts, or background properties (being a species, being a particular, etc.), that are beings of reason. Yet, his...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Girard, Charles 1935- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Peeters 2020
In: Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales
Year: 2020, Volume: 87, Issue: 2, Pages: 349-369
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Summary:Hervaeus Natalis distinguishes two types of items that can have esse obiective in the intellect: objects of acts of intellection (man, this cat, etc.) and properties unapprehended by these acts, or background properties (being a species, being a particular, etc.), that are beings of reason. Yet, his conception of the esse obiective of objects evolved. First, he had a neutral conception of esse obiective: items presenting themselves to the intellect are cognized, transparently, without being altered in the process. Later, he developed an ontologically committing conception of the objective being of objects: items presenting themselves to the intellect take on rational being (esse rationis) as such. This evolution transpires because Hervaeus introduces intentional relations as what makes the cognized item be objectively in the intellect and includes them within the class of background properties (being of reason). Both these conceptions manage to account for our access to extra-mental things.\n4207 \n4207
ISSN:1783-1717
Contains:Enthalten in: Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.2143/RTPM.87.2.3289008