Koinzidenz der Gegensätze und Voluntarisierung Gottes: Cusanus und Aristoteles
It has often been claimed that Nicholas of Cusa’s philosophy is radically anti-Aristotelian. The present article deals with the relationship between Cusanus and Aristotle and tries to show that this claim is inadequate. In fact, Aristotelian concepts and texts play an important role for Cusanus, who...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | German |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2016
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| In: |
Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales
Year: 2016, Volume: 83, Issue: 1, Pages: 95-131 |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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| Summary: | It has often been claimed that Nicholas of Cusa’s philosophy is radically anti-Aristotelian. The present article deals with the relationship between Cusanus and Aristotle and tries to show that this claim is inadequate. In fact, Aristotelian concepts and texts play an important role for Cusanus, who scrutinizes them at length. Nevertheless his criticism concerns above all two metaphysical views, namely Aristotle’s defense of the principle of non-contradiction and his denial of a free creator of the universe. These views are inconsistent with Cusanus’s metaphysics of a first cause endowed with free will in which opposites coincide. However, Cusanus’s interest does not lie so much in rejecting Aristotle’s philosophy, but rather in integrating it into his own thought. He succeeds in utilizing Aristotle in a productive manner by distinguishing between ratio and intellectus as different cognitive capacities that correspond to different concepts of philosophy.\n4207 \n4207 |
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| ISSN: | 1783-1717 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/RTPM.83.1.3154585 |
