Doxastischer Voluntarismus bei Thomas von Aquin: Wille, Intellekt und ihr schwieriges Verhältnis zur Zustimmung

Direct doxastic voluntarism claims that human beings can voluntarily decide what to believe in exactly the same way as they decide to raise an arm. Aquinas is often regarded as a proponent of this doctrine, which is widely rejected by modern philosophers. Modern defenders of Aquinas try to show that...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Schüssler, Rudolf (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:German
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Published: Peeters 2012
In: Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales
Year: 2012, Volume: 79, Issue: 1, Pages: 75-107
Online Access: Volltext (JSTOR)
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Summary:Direct doxastic voluntarism claims that human beings can voluntarily decide what to believe in exactly the same way as they decide to raise an arm. Aquinas is often regarded as a proponent of this doctrine, which is widely rejected by modern philosophers. Modern defenders of Aquinas try to show that he in fact accepted a less problematic indirect doxastic voluntarism. However, some early modern scholastics ascribed more than an indirect doxastic voluntarism to Aquinas. The present article discusses these scholastic interpretations and argues that Aquinas held a direct voluntarism of passing or suspending judgment on probable propositions in addition to an indirect doxastic voluntarism. None of these voluntarisms amount to a form of direct doxastic voluntarism in the modern sense.\n4207 \n4207
ISSN:1783-1717
Contains:Enthalten in: Recherches de théologie et philosophie médiévales
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.2143/RTPM.79.1.2168979