Reason and Emotion in the Ethics of Self-Restraint
In this essay I argue that Reinhold Niebuhr's ethics of self-restraint, though promising, is based on an incomplete and imprecise moral psychology. Although Niebuhr claims that reason cannot provide a sufficient grounding to motivate self-restraint, he does not disclose which human capacity mig...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
2014
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| In: |
Journal of religious ethics
Anno: 2014, Volume: 42, Fascicolo: 3, Pagine: 495-515 |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
David Hume
B Feminism B Emotion B Self-restraint B Reinhold Niebuhr |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Riepilogo: | In this essay I argue that Reinhold Niebuhr's ethics of self-restraint, though promising, is based on an incomplete and imprecise moral psychology. Although Niebuhr claims that reason cannot provide a sufficient grounding to motivate self-restraint, he does not disclose which human capacity might serve this purpose. I suggest that we can address this oversight by strengthening Niebuhr's tentative embrace of David Hume, and by developing a concept of the emotions in order to explain how human beings can cultivate a stable inclination to self-restraint. This project is informed by and in the service of feminist critiques of Niebuhr and social concerns. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/jore.12067 |
