THE AMBIGUITY OF MORAL EXCELLENCE: A Response to Aaron Stalnaker's “Virtue as Mastery”
This response draws on Saba Mahmood's work on Muslim subjectivities in order to consider how Stalnaker's conceptualization of virtue might be applied to non-Confucian sources. I argue that when applied cross-culturally, Stalnaker's revised definition of “skillful virtue” raises normat...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Έκδοση: |
Wiley-Blackwell
2010
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Στο/Στη: |
Journal of religious ethics
Έτος: 2010, Τόμος: 38, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 429-435 |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
moral ambiguity
B Ισλάμ (μοτίβο) B Virtue B Piety B embodied practices B cross-cultural ethics |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (JSTOR) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Σύνοψη: | This response draws on Saba Mahmood's work on Muslim subjectivities in order to consider how Stalnaker's conceptualization of virtue might be applied to non-Confucian sources. I argue that when applied cross-culturally, Stalnaker's revised definition of “skillful virtue” raises normative and metaethical questions about what counts as a skill versus a mere bodily practice, the process by how skill is acquired, and how we can both allow for the ambiguity of skills and continue to make constructive arguments about them. |
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ISSN: | 1467-9795 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Journal of religious ethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9795.2010.00437.x |